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WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF AGI? 




Lack of coherence in concepts of intelligence has implications for artificial intelligence. ‘Intelligence’ is an 
abstraction grounded in human experience while supposedly freed from the embodiment that is the basis of 
that experience. In addition to physical instantiation, embodiment is a condition of dependency, of an 
autopoietic system upon an environment, which thus matters to the system itself. The autonomy and general 
capability sought in artificial general intelligence implies artificially re-creating the organism’s natural 
condition of embodiment. That may not be feasible; and, if feasible, it may not be controllable or 
advantageous.   
 
 
1. Intelligence in the eye of the beholder?  
 
How coherent is the concept of ‘intelligence’? It remains, after all, an ill-defined and still 
controversial notion, now used roughly to mean ‘goal directed adaptive behavior’ [1]. Intelligence 
has also been defined as the ability to learn, to deal with novel situations, to adapt with insufficient 
information, to do abstract thinking, etc. It has even been defined as the ability to score well on 
intelligence tests! It is commonly accepted in AI that “intelligence measures an agent’s ability to 
achieve goals in a wide range of environments [2].” Such a statement glosses over divergent 
possible understandings of goals, environments, and agents. An ambiguity common to many 
definitions is that intelligence can refer either to observed behavior or to an inner capacity or 
potential. It is tempting, if circular, to reify observed behavior as a property or capacity inferred to 
be responsible for that behavior [3]. Little more is thereby gained than by Moliere’s “dormitive 
principle.”1 Intelligence is often misconceived as somehow substantial, which one philosopher 
wryly calls smartonium [4]. 
 
It may be equally ill-advised to conflate various behaviors or skills into one overall capacity, such 
as “problem-solving ability” or Spearman’s famous g-factor. While ability to solve one sort of 
problem carries over to some extent to other sorts of tasks, it does not necessarily transfer equally 
well to all tasks, let alone to activities that might not best be described as problem solving at all—
such as, for example, the ability to be happy. Moreover, problem solving is a different skill from 
finding, setting, or effectively defining the problems worth solving. The challenges facing society 
usually seem foisted upon us by external reality, often as emergencies. Our default responses and 
strategies are often more defensive than proactive. Another level of intelligence might involve 
better foresight and planning. Concepts of intelligence may change as our environment becomes 
progressively less natural and more artificial, consisting largely of other humans and their 
intelligent machines. 
 
Like the notion of mind-in-general, intelligence is an abstraction that is grounded in human 
experience while theoretically freed from the embodiment that is the basis of that experience. It is 
understandably anthropocentric, derived historically from comparisons among human beings, and 
then extended to comparisons of other creatures with each other and with human beings. In AI, the 
goal is to produce machines that can behave “intelligently”—in some abstract sense that is 
                                               
1 In which a sleeping potion is said to be effective because of the ‘dormitive principle’ it contains. 
extrapolated from biological and human origins. This paper explores the limits and coherence of 
what that might mean.2 	
Here we propose that the context and ultimate referent for a meaningful concept of intelligence is 
necessarily biological. Biologically, intelligence is the ability to survive. All living things are 
tautologically successful, therefore intelligent, given that the Aristotelian “final” goal of life is its 
own continuance. Though trivial sounding, this is important to note because models of intelligence 
are grounded in experience with organisms and because the ideal of artificial general intelligence 
(AGI) involves attempting to create artificial organisms that are, paradoxically, freed of the 
constraints of biology. If intelligence is neither inherently anthropocentric, nor an embodied product 
of selection, there may be essentially no consistent basis for a definition and no constraints on what 
intelligence may consist of other than those imposed by physical laws. In other words, a reasonable 
definition of intelligence must be grounded in biology. Alien intelligence, for example, need not 
resemble human intelligence any more than the alien creature need resemble the human form. 
Nevertheless, we must presume that any living creature would somehow be a product of natural 
selection. The ideal of AGI appears deceptively free of that constraint; yet, it may turn out that the 
only way for an AI to have the desired autonomy and generality is to be a product of some form of 
selection. A relevant point is that, if an AI does not constitute an artificial organism, then its 
intelligence is not actually its own but that of its creators. While it appears that autonomy is a 
question of degree, there is a categorical difference between a truly autonomous agent and a mere 
tool. It is relevant to ask whose intelligence is involved, since a tool manifests only the derived 
intelligence of the agent designing or using it. 
 
An organism is an agent in the sense that it acts on its own behalf, originating action with its own 
self-renewing energy and for its own purposes—which primarily concern its own well-being or that 
of its kind. In other words, it is an adaptive autopoietic system: one whose chief product is itself [5]. 
A species can adapt through natural selection, in which less than optimal solutions are weeded out. 
Individual specimens can adapt through self-modification, in which less optimal solutions (however 
they are stored or represented) are weeded out through ongoing experience. Posing problems or 
challenges to an agent (for example, to test or train its intelligence) is like presenting a game. The 
presumed object is to win, to achieve the goal defined by the tester. But the task from the point of 
view of the agent may be to assimilate the game and its rules to the agent’s own goals. The situation 
is different according to whether the challenge (test/training) is posed by the natural environment, 
by another agent, or by the agent itself. Tests and machine learning situations are artificial. The 
ultimate test and learning situation for organisms is the challenge to live.  
 
Many behaviors in organisms that seem to be the product of reasoning or learning are actually 
inflexible adaptations—that is, reflexes or instincts [6]. Insofar as they serve the organism, they are 
no less intelligent for that. What then is the difference between teleology and causality, when they 
seem to use the same physical processes? While the question might be spurious, it does point to 
something essential: the observer’s relation to the phenomena observed or created in laboratory. In 
the name of objectivity, science generally excludes the subject’s or observer’s role. Thus, concepts 
such as intelligence, agency, intentionality, knowledge, fact, information, truth—and even 
teleology—are artificially divorced from their dependency on a subject.3 Information, for example, 
can be defined as the reduction of uncertainty. But it is always someone’s uncertainty that is 
                                               
2 If intelligence is understood as the ability to think abstractly, then the notion of intelligence is itself intelligent. That 
conclusion is compromised, however, to the degree the concept is not self-consistent. 
3 E.g., the assumption that every proposition simply is either true or false ignores the intervention of a subject’s belief, 
uncertainty, action to test or prove the proposition, discovery of intermediate or indeterminate cases, etc. Causality and 
teleology are assumed to be natural concomitant of 3rd-person (space-time) description, but (like space and time) are 
categories invented by the brain.  
reduced. Despite Shannon, information is not an absolute property of a system. There might be 
commonality and agreement among subjects, but it is not as though no subject is involved. 
Similarly, “intelligence” is someone’s intelligence, measured by someone with a particular 
yardstick for particular purposes.  
 
2. General intelligence 
Measures of intelligence were developed to evaluate human performance in various areas of interest 
to the measurers. This gave rise to a notion of general intelligence that could underlie specific 
abilities. A hierarchical concept of intelligence would have a “domain independent” skill (g-factor) 
that informs and perhaps controls domain-specific skills. “General” can refer to the range of 
situations and also to the range of subjects. What is general across humans is not the same as what 
is general across known species or theoretically possible agents or environments. Following  
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, the intelligence measured can be no more general than the tests 
used to measure it.4  
 
It is difficult to compare animal intelligence across species, since wide-ranging sense modalities, 
cognitive capacities, and adaptations are involved. Tests may be biased by human motivations and 
sensory-motor capabilities; the tasks and rewards for testing animal intelligence are defined by 
humans, aligned with their goals. Even in the case of testing human beings, despite wide acceptance 
and appeal,5 Spearman’s g-factor has been criticized as little more than a reification whose sole 
evidence consists in the behaviors and correlations it is supposed to explain [7]. Nevertheless, the 
comparative notion of intelligence, generalized across humans, was further generalized to include 
other creatures in the comparison (G-factor for the species). The concept of artificial general 
intelligence generalizes this even further to include machines. Since it should not be 
anthropocentric—and should be independent of particular sense modalities, environments, goals, 
and even hardware—Legg and Hutter propose a concept of universal intelligence that can apply to 
“arbitrary systems.” They even suggest the possibility of a universal test [8].6  
 
In organisms, however, the evolution of specific adaptive skills must be distinguished from the 
evolution of a general skill called intelligence. In conditions of relative stability, natural selection 
would favor automatic domain-specific behavior, reliable and efficient in its context. Any pressure 
favoring general intelligence would arise rather in unstable conditions. The emergence of domain-
general cognitive processes would translate less directly into fitness-enhancing behavior, and would 
require large amounts of costly brain tissue. The question for evolutionary theory is how domain-
general processes could evolve “on top of” domain-specific adaptations and what would drive their 
emergence [9]. These are questions relevant to AGI. The circumstances that lead to an increase in 
                                               
4 If intelligence is defined as the ability to pass intelligence tests, then a specific test could be customized to defeat any 
given agent. In other words, there cannot be a fixed test (or algorithm) for general intelligence. 
5 For instance, “…g in humans has a clear genetic foundation … Furthermore, g has robust correlates in brain structure 
and function, such as brain size, gray matter substance, cortical thickness, or processing … Finally, g is also a good 
predictor for various measures of life outcome, including school achievement, the probability of being in professional 
careers, occupational attainment, job performance, social mobility, and even health and survival.” [Burkhardt et al, p5] 
6 “…if we could formally define and measure the complexity of test problems using complexity theory we could 
construct a formal test of intelligence. The possibility of doing this was perhaps first suggested by Chaitin... While this 
path requires numerous difficulties to be dealt with, we believe that it is the most natural and offers many advantages: It 
is formally motivated, precisely defined and potentially could be used to measure the performance of both computers 
and biological systems on the same scale without the problem of bias towards any particular species or culture.” [Legg 
& Hutter, p36]  
 
  
natural general intelligence—rather than (or in addition to) specific skills—may shed light on the 
differences between an AI agent or tool.  
 
In light of the benefits of general intelligence, why do not all species evolve bigger and more 
powerful brains? Every living species is by definition smart enough for its current niche [10]. Its 
intelligence is an economical adaptation to that niche. It would seem, as far as life is concerned, that 
general intelligence is not only costly but implies a general niche, whatever that can mean. Humans, 
for example, evolved to fit a wide range of changing conditions and environments, which they 
continue to further expand through technology. Even as (or if) we stabilize the natural environment, 
the human world changes ever more rapidly—requiring more general intelligence to adapt to it. 
“Universal” intelligence would imply a universal environment—that is, one so abstract that it is 
completely liberated from all particulars, including human conceptions! Yet, universal intelligence 
is but a human idea and ideal, constrained to the limits of imagination and the world as presently 
conceived. We do, of course, recognize such limits and that the future is unknown. It is perhaps in 
order to reassure ourselves in the face of that uncertainty that we conceive of intelligence somewhat 
as a magical power to deal with the unknown. 
 
A general intelligence factor at the head of a hierarchy of skills could involve executive functions, 
such as inhibitory controls and selective attention—in other words, conscious control [11]. Yet, a 
definition of the intelligence or cognition of an agent need not involve phenomenality,7 let alone 
self-consciousness. Because the only cognition we know subjectively is our own, we tend 
nevertheless to think of it as involving some conscious content (if not our own, then something 
nebulously like it or some “degree” of it). But cognition and intelligence can both be regarded in 
purely behavioral terms. And the primary behavior involved for artificial agents (as for organisms) 
is self-production (autopoiesis), which does not of itself imply consciousness. While personhood 
presumes agency, and goes beyond it, agency itself can be considered from the 3rd-person. Even 
valuation does not have to imply conscious sensation or feeling, though for humans it obviously 
involves them. On the other hand, while concepts of general intelligence are based on human 
experience and performance, it remains unclear to what extent an AI could satisfy the criteria for 
human-level general intelligence without itself being—if not conscious—at least an embodied 
autonomous entity: effectively an organism. 
Creating programs for computers diverges from creating biological-like robots. The former tends to 
aim for general intelligence capable of solving human mental challenges; the latter tends toward 
simple artificial creatures that imitate the physical behavior of simple natural creatures. The former 
approaches from the top down, the latter from the bottom up. But neither computer simulations of 
embodiment nor physical robots constitute embodied agency as here understood—so far.  
 
3. Intelligence as computation 
 
The possibility to understand mind as computation, and to view the brain metaphorically as a 
computer, is one of the great achievements of the computer age. Computer science and brain 
science have productively cross-pollinated. Yet, mind is a vague concept not exclusively related to 
brain. Mind and thinking suggest reasoning and an algorithmic approach—the ideal of intellectual 
thought—which is only a small part of the brain’s activity responsible for the organism as a whole. 
The computer metaphor is underwritten more broadly by the mechanist metaphor, which holds that 
any behavior of a biological “system” could be reduced to an algorithm. However, the idea of 
system is already an idealization in which the structure and behavior of an organism is redefined in 
mechanist terms. (Being defined in the first place, it is reconfigured to consist only of defined parts 
                                               
7 I.e., qualia 
and relationships.) The natural thing is no longer a product or denizen of nature, but now a product 
of formal definition and a denizen of a human conceptual domain. The ability to define, to abstract 
and idealize, and to manipulate such abstractions in a thought world, is considered the hallmark of 
intelligence. Yet the degree to which idealizations fail to fit reality, with possible serious 
consequences, calls that intelligence into question.  
 
The converse of the challenge to understand natural intelligence through computation is to 
understand machine intelligence in terms of (human) thought processes. Part of that quest should be 
to understand how our own mental processes—including language—unconsciously shape concepts 
of machine intelligence. It seems reasonable that to understand the lawful (i.e., algorithmic) basis of 
behavior in organisms, one should attempt to program a computer to perform that behavior: “to 
build intelligence” rather than simply to study the external behavior of intelligent agents or dissect 
their inner workings [12]. However, “that behavior” already presumes a description—that is, a 
reduction of the behavior to a linguistic expression. Creating a program to produce action that meets 
that description does not exhaust the reality of what the organism is doing. The catch is that the 
behavior as described in language and as prescribed in the algorithm may correspond to each other 
(being reducible to a common formula), while neither corresponds perfectly to the real behavior of 
the organism, which is not a literal machine nor a matter of human definition. This poses a serious 
limitation on the computational metaphor. It also shows how language, and categories of thought 
based upon it, can mislead. To conceive of “flight” as an abstraction not pinned to creatures 
flapping their wings has enabled us to create machines that “fly.” While aerodynamics seems to 
liberate flying from biology, the common basis between birds and airplanes is not only 
aerodynamics; it is also the intent to move freely in 3 dimensions, to get from one place to another, 
etc. These are creaturely motives and human creatures are not independent them. If we view 
intelligence in that light, it is grounded in biological needs as much as flight is. Similarly, a human 
baseball pitcher performs “the same” action as a baseball pitching machine. But the devil is in the 
details, which are obscured by the rubric “pitching.” The rubrics “thinking” and “intelligence” may 
obscure important details and mislead us when trying to assimilate within a single concept the 
activity of machines and of brains.  
 
4. Natural intelligence is embodied  
Physical instantiation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for embodiment, which further 
requires a relationship of dependency upon an environment. The precarious dependency of life on 
environment is the reason why things matter to organisms and not to machines [13]. True (i.e., 
“strong”) embodiment for a robot would thus mean that it is integrated and connected to the world 
in the same ways as an organism: not only through a sensory-motor interface but also through its 
own valuations, of events that matter to it because of its critical dependency on the world. For 
organisms, this state of affairs comes about through natural selection, such that only those systems 
exist that are internally organized to behave in ways that preserve, or at least permit, their 
continuing existence. An autopoietic system is a type of homeostatic system that tries to keep 
constant the conditions required for its own existence. The “intelligence” of the autopoietic system 
is ultimately its ability to maintain and preserve itself. 
Robots resemble organisms insofar as their hardware and software are integrated in a physical body. 
On the other hand, AI is usually not physically instantiated. It consists of software in a computer, 
which may, however, have access to the real world through sensors and controls over real systems. 
To be an agent, it must be embodied in the further sense of being an autopoietic system. That means 
it will have its own intelligence and goals, in pursuit of its own existence, which may conflict with 
the human programmer’s goals. 
 
Much of the contemporary study of “embodied” systems focuses on the effects of the particular 
physical instantiation of robots on locomotion and cognition—especially on how morphology itself 
can substitute for representation. However, this ignores the crucial relevance of embodiment as an 
autopoietic relationship with the world. It tends also to be limited to relatively simple creatures and 
their robotic versions. Yet, the research commitment to autonomy and general intelligence in 
pursuit of total automation leads inexorably in the direction of true embodiment. Paradoxically, that 
means that the desire to extend control indefinitely through automation may lead ultimately to a loss 
of control—because embodied AI will have a will of its own. Of course, quite apart from presumed 
human utility, another motive to re-create embodiment artificially is the sheer challenge to match 
nature by creating artificial life. This may have the added benefit of deeper understanding, on 
Vico’s principle that we truly understand only that which we make. The goal is not to simulate 
intelligence so much as to actually synthesize it in real systems [14]—if that is even a valid 
distinction in this context. And if, indeed, the benefits of intellectual understanding outweigh the 
risks of such a venture. 
 
Whatever its motivation, recreating embodiment may be easier said than done. Nature effected it 
through natural selection over generations of reproducing and dying individuals. Artificial evolution 
of software takes place within computers and does not involve physical instantiation. The evolved 
software can be physically connected to hardware after the fact, but this is not the same as natural 
evolution any more than brains (or, for that matter, genes) evolve separately from their bodies. The 
unit of selection is the physical individual, which is an integration of software and hardware in a 
body that self-produces in the real world. A physical robot has that integration but is not self-
producing, let alone reproducing. The artificial equivalent of natural selection for robots would 
imply generations of robot bodies wastefully (and painfully) destroyed.  
 
While it is conceivable for a robot body to self-assemble, self-maintain, and adaptively reconfigure 
itself, a key difference between organisms and machines is that creatures consist of parts (cells) that 
are autopoeitic on their own scale, which means they too can reconfigure themselves adaptively. A 
machine might be self-repairing, but might not consist of parts that are self-repairing. A machine 
might conceivably have its own goals (related to its own well-being), but not consist of parts that 
have their own goals, subordinated somehow to the well-being of the machine as a whole. To re-
create the agency of organisms artificially, it might be necessary to re-create the composite structure 
of organisms: machine components (as well as computational ones) that can autonomously and 
adaptively reconfigure themselves physically and also put themselves together in just the right way 
[15]. This is a matter that deserves further investigation, at the intersection of biology and 
computation. A further consideration, often overlooked, is that autopoietic systems are not only 
self-producing and self-repairing but also self-defining. In the case of AI, that would mean self-
programming. An individual organism inherits an initial genetic program; yet, on a species level, 
that program was also self-producing. Its unfolding also depends on a multitude of “epigenetic” 
factors. This raises the question: how, and to what extent, can human programmers stand in for 
millions of years of natural self-programming, even to provide a minimal “seed” of a self-
developing AI?  How much of that can be hard-coded initial information versus some source of 
guidance for further learning and growth [16]?  
 
Must an AI be an agent to achieve full autonomy, with human-level general intelligence and 
beyond? If so, the agent itself decides how to divide up the world and to reason about it [17]. But on 
what basis, if not in terms of its own preferences? Learning about the preferences of others is not 
the same as having those preferences oneself. Training of animals is done with rewards, but the 
reward is valued by the animal because it already has needs and preferences of its own. Training of 
AI cannot mean the same thing unless the AI is similarly an agent. Achieving a goal makes no 
difference to the AI unless it is an autopoietic system. Rewards would make no difference unless 
the system “values” them, and value can only come from the consequence to a system that matters 
to the system itself. How does a machine come to have preferences of its own, to value something 
at all? Short of that, the machine can only do what it is told to do, even when that includes learning 
from its interpretation of human preferences and behavior. 
While it is true that even neural networks can be fooled because the situation they are in means 
nothing to them [18], it hardly follows that agency would increase reliability from a human 
standpoint. Artificial agents may be unreliable because they have a will of their own; but also 
because they may be vulnerable to the kinds of error that human agents are and for similar reasons. 
Reliability toward humanly-defined goals can be achieved in AI simply by adding refinements ad 
hoc to non-agential tools, asymptotically reducing the chance of error. The system—such as the 
self-driving car—need not be fool-proof; it need only reach a desired statistical reliability. In other 
words, in many situations there may be no net advantage to creating an agent. The ideal of 
intelligence as a magic bullet, tacitly behind AGI, refers to the ability of an agent to look after itself, 
not its capacity to satisfy humans. 
Abilities—of people, animals, or machines—are human concepts. The currency of “smartonium” is 
ultimately backed up by success in a real environment. Not only can adaptability be a function of 
brain size, but the converse may be true insofar as survival rate is a precondition for the opportunity 
to evolve larger brain size. Only species not subject to high predation pressure would have that 
opportunity [19]. Brain size and intelligence for primates are a function as well of opportunities for 
social learning; the intelligence of our species correlates with human socialization, including intense 
maternal care. Yet, the relationship between general intelligence and socio-cognitive abilities in 
humans remains incompletely understood [20]. Socialization for artificial intelligence has scarcely 
been studied. And the incompletely understood role of consciousness in general intelligence leaves 
unanswered the question of whether the high expectations of AGI could be fulfilled without some 
equivalent of human consciousness.  
 
 
5. Whose agency? 
The tasks of the conscious human person are not (necessarily) the tasks of the biological human 
organism. It is probably this psychological fact that allows us to conceive of an ideal agent pursuing 
arbitrary goals, whereas the goals of living things are hardly arbitrary. As far as it is relevant to 
humans, the intelligence of other entities (whether natural or artificial) must be measured by their 
capacity to further or thwart human aims. Whatever does not interact with us in ways of interest to 
us may not even be recognized as intelligence. 
An AI can be a goal-seeking artifact—such as a guided missile, robot, expert system, or infobot—
without being an agent in the sense explored here. In particular, such artifacts are allopoietic 
systems, which take for granted—or leave out of the picture—exactly whose goals are pursued and 
why. Perhaps this omission arises because agency in general is out of bounds for the scientific 
version of naive realism, which excludes any form of subjectivity [21].8 A similar problem besets 
biology, when the organism is considered only from the point of view of the observer yet the 
challenge is to understand how things can be meaningful for a system from its own perspective 
[22]. An organism is not only an object for an observer, but is also a subject in its own right—not 
necessarily in the sense of having phenomenal experience, but at least in the sense of being an 
agent, acting in its own interests.  
                                               
8 It also dodges epistemic, ethical, and legal responsibility. 
Information is “a difference that makes a difference” [23] to an agent. A difference in some domain 
must be recognized by a cognitive system that maps that difference to some difference within itself, 
upon which it can act according to an agenda that favors or at least permits the system’s continuing 
existence. Only then is it information for the system. If the difference matters only to the observer, 
then it is information for the observer but not for the system in question; if it matters only to the 
system, it will likely not even be noticed by the observer. That is a key difference between 
autopoietic and allopoietic systems: the information processed by an AI agent matters to it and is 
used by it for its own purposes, whereas the information processed by an AI tool (such as a 
computer) exists only for the mind and purposes of the human user. A glib use of language permits 
speaking of programming AI tools to “have” goals; but clearly the goals are the programmer’s. 
Similarly, the intelligence of the AI tool is the intelligence of the programmer. What does it mean, 
then, to create AI that is more intelligent than humans? Straightforwardly, it can mean that a skill 
valued by humans is automated to more effectively achieve human goals. We are used to this idea, 
since every tool and machine was motivated by such improvement and usually achieves it until 
something better comes along. But is general intelligence a skill that can be so augmented, 
automated, and treated as a tool? Or are only agents capable of it? If the latter, then their 





This brings us to the question: why pursue AGI? If the goal is to build powerful and flexible 
machines [24] to serve human purposes, then we should shy away from the chimeric idea that 
agents can be made to serve human purposes better than tools. Whether or not they have a 
subjective inner life, they will be dedicated to their own purposes.9 We tried augmenting human 
labor with animal slaves and then built machines as more efficient and powerful replacements. We 
tried human slavery as well. But a machine designed to replace the human slave—by a service 
cheaper, more reliable, and even more intelligent—is the goal of the designer, not of the machine. 
However devoted to the master, the goal of a human slave is to live. This would be no less true of 
artificial agents. Quite apart from ethics, we cannot expect intelligent artificial slaves to remain 
subservient. To create artificial agents for some other reason—for example, as companions or 
mentors—would follow an entirely different motivation. In that case, such agents might, like us, 
seek to live and work together harmoniously as part of an extended society [25]. Given the example 
of human history, however, one shouldn’t count on it. 
 
 7. Superintelligence 
Even if speed were the only criterion, it might seem reasonable to suppose that any electronic 
equivalent of a natural organism would at least be as many times more “intelligent” as the speed of 
electricity is faster than electrochemical processes. Yet, the idea of superintelligence can be no 
more coherent than our concepts of “ordinary” intelligence. (In fact, far less so, since we might not 
be able even to comprehend it.) If universal intelligence (the u-factor?) is not a coherent notion, 
then neither is u+. If smartonium is a myth, then so is supersmartonium. While there is evidence for 
the g-factor across human beings, the prospect of automating and amplifying it in AI is a different 
and questionable matter.  
                                               
9 Subjective qualities such as understanding, consciousness, creativity, imagination, free will, emotion, etc. “are only 
relevant to our goal to the extent to which they have some measurable effect on performance in some well-defined 
environment… The question is whether they are relevant or not.” [Legg & Hutter p42] 
What do we expect of artificial superintelligence? We want it to do what we want, better than we 
can, and without supervision. This raises several questions—and should raise eyebrows. Will it do 
what we want, or how can it be made to do so? How will we trust its (superior) judgment if its 
considerations are unintelligible to us? How autonomous can AI be short of being an agent? Can a 
sophisticated non-agential AI be accidentally triggered to become an agent? What are the necessary 
conditions for AI to become an agent? 
Other questions arise as well. Motives, desires, and goals have evolved in organisms through 
natural selection; animals have been bred and trained to fulfil human wishes. Can goals or motives 
be programmed into AI agents, either built in from scratch or trained in through machine learning? 
How will that differ from programming or training AI tools? Superintelligent artificial agents, if 
such are feasible, may pose a threat to human beings whether or not we consider them conscious. 
But what about superintelligent tools? Is an AI takeover by non-agential tools a threat and what 
would it look like?  
 
8. Conclusion 
Simon and Newell’s founding premise for AI is that formal symbol manipulation is both a 
necessary and sufficient mechanism for general intelligent behavior. The weakness of this thesis is 
that “general” intelligent behavior is less general than supposed, referring (circularly?) to the 
restricted sorts of behavior that can be formalized in order to accomplish specific kinds of goals. 
The ideal is to be able to inform a flexible AI of any goal and rely on it to efficiently achieve it. The 
“intelligence” presumed for this degree of flexibility may, however, imply a system that has its own 
competing goals: an agent, which is an adapting autopoietic system. The ideal of universal 
intelligence implies a purely syntactic computerized version of the general intelligence manifested 
by living things (humans, in particular). It extends the ideal of the universal machine, in the form of 
a powerful system that can accept and carry out any arbitrary goal but has no goal of its own. This 
may prove to be a contradiction in terms. One tacitly expects intelligence to be fully agential, with 
semantic and real-world interaction, while inconsistently hoping for a non-agential version—or, at 
least, a subservient slave. Indeed, slavery illustrates the problem of control and the dilemma of 
programming agents externally. 
While concepts of intelligence are grounded in human experience (consciousness), they have been 
abstracted to constitute a property theoretically independent both of consciousness and 
embodiment, and transferable to non-living systems. However, the ideal of universal intelligence 
fails to be liberated from biology and anthropocentrism. In contrast to its disembodied view of 
cognition, a “biogenic” view (as opposed to an “anthropogenic” one) emphasizes the organism’s 
ongoing assessment of its situation and its own valuation of stimuli in terms of its own embodied 
well-being [26]. The quest for superintelligence raises the question: under what circumstance could 
machines become self-interested agents, competing with each other and with humans and other life 
forms for resources and their very existence? The dangers of superintelligence attend the motive to 
achieve ever greater autonomy, the extreme of which is the genuine autonomy manifest by living 
things. AI should instead focus on creating powerful tools that remain under human control. That 
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